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WOMEN IN THE LAWYERING PROCESS: THE
COMPLICATIONS OF CATEGORIES*
JUDY SCALES-TRENT**

Professor Epstein reminds us of an important fact. She reminds us that
the legal system-courts, law firms, and law schools-is rife with
discrimination against women.1 She also reminds us that the law is used
as a tool for ordering and maintaining gender distinctions. 2 While
focusing on the power of the law, however, we must not lose sight of the
fact that the law is only one of the many agents in society which does that.
Although scholars may study the legal system as a separate entity, that
does not mean that the legal system actually exists as a separate entity. It
does not. It exists as an integral part of the complicaied fabric of racism
and sexism in this country. I also want to emphasize, and I am not sure
that Professor Epstein and I disagree on this point, that the harm done to
women, within and by the legal system, is not a "consequence of the
difference model," but a consequence of sexism. If the social goal is the
repression of a particular group, the group which is participating in the
oppression will use any theoretical model to achieve that end.
The notion that I find most compelling in her paper is Professor
Epstein's emphasis on the power of categories in creating and maintaining
differences. 3 She notes first that "categories and distinctions are necessary
for analysis in science as well as in everyday social communication." 4
She then points out the problems that are created when categories become
rigid, are "reified," and are "regarded as real, [and] worse, as
inevitable."'
These notions have been important in my work. I have been interested
primarily in the intersection of the race category and the sex category in
American law. Historically, in both statutory and constitutional
jurisprudence, analysts and courts have considered these two categories
inviolable. They exist as distinct analytic frameworks within the law.
There may be discrimination based on sex or discrimination based on race.

* Presented at New York Law School Law Review's Symposium on Women in the
Lawyering Workplace: Feminist Considerations and Practical Solutions (March 15, 1990).
** Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. Oberlin College, B.A.;
Middlebury College, M.A.; Northwestern University School of Law, J.D.
1. See generally Epstein, Faulty Framework"Consequences of the Difference Model
for Women in the Law, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 309 (1990).
2. Id. at 321-22.
3. Id. at 312-14.
4. Id. at 312.
5. Id.
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These categories, of course, reflect the way these issues are discussed in

popular discourse: one speaks of "women's issues," or of "minority
issues." One says "minorities and women." The result of this way of
thinking; the creation and maintenance of these rigid categories, is that it
leads to the invisibility of minority women and the invisibility of the issues
which affect them. The rule appears to be that these two categories do not
intersect. In my work, I have argued that this rule must be broken.6
More recently, I have written about the black category and the white
category in American society.7 Again, the rule is that these categories do
not intersect. And again I say, "But of course they do." For I, like many
other black Americans, look white. The categories of black and white are
not inviolable. They can and do indeed intersect. The reaction to this is
that people are disturbed. Many are troubled when the boundaries of
categories are transgressed. Categories exist to make the world
comprehensible and safe. The gatekeepers resist. "Stay in your placel"
they shout.8 But I can't and we can't. Our place is in several different
"places."
We should all be clear, however, that I am not the only one who
exists at the intersection of "non-intersecting categories." And black
women are not the only group that exists at the intersection of "nonintersecting categories." Black men, white women, white men, all exist at
the intersection of race and sex. But somehow, these groups are not
viewed in the same way, because for some people, some of the categories
are invisible. For example, for black men, the sex category is invisible.
Black men are "powerful" through their masculinity, and therefore often
do not focus on the gender attribute of their identity. For white women,
the race category is invisible. Their race is an attribute of power, and
therefore they often do not think of themselves as having a race. For white
men, all categories are invisible. White men are just regular people! They
are the paradigm of what is normal. All the rest of us wear some stigma
of "otherness."
My favorite example of this phenomenon grows out of an employment
discrimination suit against Sullivan & Cromwell." In this case, Diane
Blank filed suit in federal district court alleging that the law firm had

6. See Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution:Finding Our Place, Asserting
Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989).
7. Scales-Trent, Comnonalities: On Being Black and White, Different, and the Same,
2 YALE J. L. & FEM. 305 (1990).
8. For a thought-provoklng discussion of what occurs at these "gates" or "doors," see
E. SPELMAN, INESSENUIALWOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSIONIN FEMINISTTHOUGHT 14451(1988).
9. Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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refused to hire her as an associate solely because of her sex.' The case
was assigned to Judge Constance Baker Motley, one of the few black
women judges in the federal judiciary. In a stunning display of this notion
of "invisibility," attorneys for Sullivan & Cromwell filed a motion for
recusal based on the notion that as a black woman, Judge Motley would
not be able to be fair on the issue of discrimination. 1' Judge Motley
made quick work of their "argument," pointing out that she was not the
only judge with both a gender and a race, and was therefore not the only
judge who might be interested in the existence of sexism and racism at
Sullivan & Cromwell.12
So not only are there "non-intersecting" categories that intersect, there
are also categories that are invisible based on one's place in the power
structure. One important indicator of power is the ability to put others,
and not oneself, into categories. It is the ability to not see the privilege
that inheres in the categories in which one holds membership.
And we are only scratching the surface of the category issue. Let me
make two other points. The first is that the perception of who we are with
respect to these categories changes from time to time. The first time I
noticed this phenomenon was at the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) in Washington, D.C. It was during the Carter years,
when Eleanor Holmes Norton was pushing the agency to develop
guidelines on important issues affecting employers and employees. As
Special Assistant to one of the Commissioners, I had been involved in
developing the agency guidelines on discrimination on the basis of
religion. One day I attended a meeting which had been requested by
representatives of a national Jewish organization, who wanted to comment
on the proposed guidelines. The discussion was thoughtful and helpful.
But then, at what I thought was the end of the discussion, the
spokesperson said, "I must add that we have serious problems with your
proposed Affirmative Actions Guidelines, and would like to discuss them
also while we're here." Certainly there was nothing wrong with this
comment. Everyone has the right to comment on all- oposed agency
action. But what struck me was that, right before my very eyes, the group
changed categories. It transformed itself from "Jewish" to "white."
The second time I noticed the power of these categories to appear and
disappear was when I moved to Buffalo to teach law school, from
Washington, D.C., where I had worked at the EEOC. Washington, as you
probably know, is a city that is predominantly black. It is a town where
the mayor is black, where the school superintendent is black. It is a town
where one is startled to see a white policeman or fireman! The work force
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 4-5.
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at the EEOC-attorneys, administrators, division heads, clerks, cooks-is
also predominantly black. It was somewhat of a shock to me, therefore,
to move to white academia, where the administrators, faculty, clerks, and
painters were white; and to a city where the power structure was all
white. I was struck by the fact that, whereas in Washington I felt a need
to struggle against sexism, in Buffalo I was almost overwhelmed by the
devastating impact of racism. I had changed categories. I had gone from
being a woman who just happened to be black, to a black person who just
happened to be a woman. Categories that had been vaguely invisible
became visible. Categories that had been visible receded into the
background.
My second point is that each of these categories intersects with many
other categories. I was very likely invited to speak here today from the
perspective of a black woman. I find nothing wrong with this. We need
to try to hear as many different voices as we can. But black women are
many and varied. There is a sense in which I cannot speak for a black
woman with dark skin. I cannot speak for a black woman in a wheelchair.
I cannot speak for the black woman who is probably cleaning my hotel
room right now. The different categories of color, disability, and class
also intersect with the categories of race and sex. Because of this, we are
perceived, and we perceive the world, in different ways. The category
"black woman" is itself a very complicated notion.
Because of these complexities in the nature of the categories with
which we deal, I was troubled by the way in which Professor Epstein
presented certain issues. The first concerned her discussion of
discrimination against women in law firms with respect to promotion to
partner. The question that I would ask here is: "Which women lawyers is
she talking about?" Is she including black women lawyers? I hardly think
so, because the struggle for black women in law firms is the struggle to
get hired at all. A 1989 survey of the nation's 250 largest law firms
showed that while white women have made impressive gains in the past
ten years, there was no comparable gain for black women.13 In 1981,
approximately one-quarter of all associates in these firms were women and
three percent of them were minority.' 4 Yet, eight years later, while
almost one-third of the associates in these firms were women, only 5%of
them were minority." With this kind of availability pool, the partnership

13. Jensen, Minorities Didn't Share in Firm Growth, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 19, 1990, at 1,
col. 1.
14. Id. at 28.
15. Id. It is not surprising that the writer of this article based her analysis on the
categories "minorities" and "women," thus obscuring the position of minority women
lawyers in these firms. However, the one statistic she gave for black women lawyers is so
stunning (only 40 of the 23,195 partners at these firms are black women) that I have
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numbers are predictable. Since 1980, the percentage of women partners
has more than tripled to 9.2% of the total, while the percentage of black
partners increased only from 0.47% to 0.9%.6 There are 23,195
partners in these law firms: 170 of them are black men, forty of them are
black women.' 7
These numbers show us the result of the interlocking effect of racism
and sexism on the opportunities of black women lawyers. Promotion to
partnership and obtaining the better assignments in law firms are hardly

the prime issues for black women lawyers. The prime issue is getting a

job. 8 In fact, because of the difficulty in getting hired by law firms,

almost half of all black women lawyers are employed by the government
or by public interest law firms."9
At another point, Professor Epstein discussed the problem of
discriminatory sentencing. She argued that the sentencing outcome depends

on the degree to which the crime was at variance with the female role, the
degree to which the women stepped out the gender role expectancies.'

Again, I wonder if this is reflective of the different kinds of "gender role
expectancies" for black and white women. Does the "double whammy"

of racism and sexism operate differently in the sentencing process than it
does elsewhere in society? I would like to know more about the

complexities of this issue. 2 '

All of this is to say that Professor Epstein's discussion of the

importance of categories in our society led me to more questions. I would

like to know more about how these categories are formed. I would like to
hear more about why the structure of dichotomous categories is so

assumed that black women in her study were included in the "minority" category rather
than the "women" category.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1, 28.
18. For a glimpse of one particularly telling recruitment interview, see University of
Chicago Bars Recruiters of Top Firms Because of Slurs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1989, at
B 11, col. 3 (law firm barred from recruiting because the interviewer, a partner in the firm,
asked a black woman law student how she would respond if opposing counsel called her
a "black bitch").
19. Burleigh, Black Women Lawyers Coping with DualDiscrimination, 74 A.B.A. I.,
June 1988, at 64, 67.
20. Remarks by Professor Epstein atNew York Law School Law Review's Symposium
on Women in the Lawyering Workplace: Feminist Considerations and Practical Solutions
(March 15, 1990).
21. Professor Kathleen Daly of the Sociology Department at Yale University suggests
that studies on sentencing are likely to reflect the experiences of black women, since a
disproportionate number of women in the criminal justice system are black. Telephone
interview with Kathleen Daly (Apr. 10, 1990). See also Daly, New FeministDefinitions of
Justice, 1989 INST. WOMEN'S POL'Y RES. 7.

342

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

compelling. And I would especially like to learn how the notion of

difference within the legal culture plays out for different kinds of women.

